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Abstract
I argue that time travel to the past is impossible, given a certain meta-
physical theory, namely, The Dynamic Theory of Time. I first spell out 
my particular way of capturing the difference between The Dynamic 
Theory of Time and its rival, The Static Theory of Time. Next I offer 
four different arguments for the conclusion that The Dynamic Theory 
is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past. Then I 
argue that, even if I am wrong about this, it will still be true that The 
Dynamic Theory entails that you should not want to travel back to the 
past. Finally, I conclude by considering a puzzle that arises for those 
who believe that time travel to the past is metaphysically impossible: 
What exactly are we thinking about when we seem to be thinking 
about traveling back in time? For it certainly does not feel like we are 
thinking about something that is metaphysically impossible.
Keywords
Time travel, Dynamic Theory of Time, Static Theory of Time, backward 
causation, presentism.
1 Introduction
Most people will tell you that the inexorable passage of time is a 
real thing, and (for better or worse) one of the more salient aspects 
of reality.1 For most people endorse what is sometimes called The 
Dynamic Theory of Time, according to which time really passes, 
and there are fundamental differences between the past, the present, 
and the future. But most people also love a good time travel story, 
1 By ‘most people’ I do not mean most philosophers but, rather, most people 
in general.
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and would probably jump at the chance to travel back in time (either 
going back and merely blending in, so that nothing changes, or else 
going back and changing the past), if only they could.
All of this is a problem, I will argue, because The Dynamic Theo-
ry of Time entails that time travel to the past is not merely difficult, 
or prohibitively expensive, but downright metaphysically impossible. 
If The Dynamic Theory is true, as most people believe, then it is not 
possible to travel back in time. Not only that but, as I will further ar-
gue, even if I happen to be wrong about The Dynamic Theory entail-
ing the metaphysical impossibility of time travel to the past, it will 
still be true that The Dynamic Theory entails that we should not want 
to travel back to the past. So most people want to do a thing that they 
should not want to do (given what they believe about time), and that 
is in fact not even possible (again given what they believe about time).
Or so I will argue in this paper. Then I will address a further 
puzzle that arises from the thesis that time travel to the past is meta-
physically impossible: Many of our favorite stories involve time travel 
to the past, but do not have the distinctive feel of a story based on a 
metaphysically impossible premise. This raises a question concern-
ing what we are thinking about when we consider time travel stories. 
In the last section of the paper I will try to resolve this puzzle in a 
way that is consistent with my thesis that time travel to the past is 
metaphysically impossible.
But before I get to all of that, I want to start by offering a new way 
of capturing the distinction between The Dynamic Theory of Time 
and its rival, The Static Theory of Time.
2 Two theories about the nature of time
The guiding thought behind The Static Theory of Time is that 
time is similar to space.2 Some people think this follows from The 
2 The degree to which time is thought to be similar to the dimensions of space 
will vary from one Static Theorist to another. For example, some Static Theorists 
may want to take the asymmetry in what is allowed along time-like dimensions by 
special relativity (or some other physical theory) to be an intrinsic feature of time 
itself, rather than merely a contingent fact about the spread of physical phenom-
ena in the actual universe. And such people will want to say that time is different 
in at least some important respects from the other dimensions of the spacetime 
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Special Theory of Relativity, but in my view that is a mistake. The 
idea that time is like space is certainly an interesting—and even 
compelling—way to think about time, but it is not forced upon 
us by The Special Theory of Relativity, or indeed by any other 
empirical theory.3
Here is some terminology that will be useful in stating both The 
Static Theory and The Dynamic Theory.4
A-properties: putative temporal properties such as being present, 
being past, being future, being four days future, etc.
B-relations: temporal relations such as simultaneous with, earlier 
than, later than, four days later than, etc.
And here are six ways in which time is supposed to be like space, 
on The Static Theory of Time.5 (It is worth emphasizing that the 
different components I am building into The Static Theory need 
not all be combined in this way. There are various “mix and match” 
combinations that have been endorsed in print. But the combination 
presented here is probably the most popular in the literature, and 
arguably the most interesting. It is also worth emphasizing that, since 
all of the arguments below are concerned with what is entailed by 
The Dynamic Theory of Time, rather than The Static Theory, noth-
ing in what follows turns on the choice of a specific version of The 
Static Theory.)
manifold. But all Static Theorists will agree that time is in some significant ways 
similar to the dimensions of space.
3 This point has been made before. See for example Emery 2019, Hinchliff 
2000, Miller 2004, Markosian 2004: Section 3.9, and Zimmerman 2008: 218–21.
4 The terms ‘A-property’ and ‘B-relation’ are first used together in Markosian 
1993, but they derive from McTaggart’s talk of an A-series and a B-series. See 
McTaggart 1908.
5 Some or all of the following components of The Static Theory can be found 
in Williams 1951, Price 1977, Smart 1966, Lewis 1976, Sider 2001, Hawley 
2001, and Moss 2012. (As well as many other places.) Much more could be said 
about each of the components of the theory. But then this paper would be a book.
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The Static Theory of Time
1. The universe is spread out in four dimensions (each one or-
thogonal to each other one), which together make up a unified, 
four-dimensional manifold (appropriately called spacetime) in 
which physical objects are located and possibly extended.
2. Any physical object that persists through time does so in virtue 
of having a temporal part at each moment at which it is present.
3. There are no genuine and irreducible A-properties; all talk 
that appears to be about A-properties can be correctly ana-
lyzed in terms of B-relations.
4. The temporal facts about the world include facts about B-re-
lations, but they do not include any facts about A-properties.
5. We do not need to take tense seriously. Propositions have truth 
values simpliciter rather than at times, and so cannot change 
their truth values over time. Also, we can in principle eliminate 
verbal tenses like is, was, and will be from an ideal language.
6. The correct ontology does not change over time, and it al-
ways includes objects from every region of spacetime.
Static Theorists admit that time seems special to us, and that in fact 
time appears to have a dynamic aspect that makes it different from 
space. But they insist that this is just a subjective feature of con-
sciousness—of how we experience the world—and not an objective 
feature of reality that is independent of us.6
For The Dynamic Theory of Time, on the other hand, the guid-
ing thought is that time is very different from space, in a number of 
ways. Opponents of The Dynamic Theory (and sometimes propo-
nents as well) like to characterize the theory using the metaphor of a 
moving spotlight that slides along the temporal dimension, brightly 
illuminating just one moment of time, the present, while the future 
is a kind of foggy region of potential and the past is a shadowy realm 
6 See for example Paul 2010.
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of what has been. But it is important to understand that while the 
moving spotlight is an intuitively appealing way to capture the idea 
behind The Dynamic Theory, in the end it is just a metaphor. What 
the metaphor represents is the essential idea behind The Dynam-
ic Theory, namely, the idea that being future, being present, and being 
past are objective and metaphysically significant properties of times, 
events, and things. Also, the metaphor of the moving spotlight rep-
resents the fact that according to The Dynamic Theory, each time 
undergoes a somewhat peculiar but inexorable process, sometimes 
called temporal becoming. It goes from being in the distant future to 
being in the near future, it has a brief moment of glory in the present, 
and then it recedes forever further and further into the past.
Despite its being intuitively appealing (especially for Static Theo-
rists, who see it as a caricature of The Dynamic Theory), the mov-
ing spotlight metaphor has a major drawback: It encourages us to 
think of time as a fourth dimension, akin to the dimensions of space. 
But for The Dynamic Theory, as I am understanding it, this way of 
thinking—“spatializing time”—is a major no-no. On The Dynamic 
Theory, it is not that there are these four similar but orthogonal di-
mensions, which together make up a unified manifold, and one of 
which just happens to have some extra bells and whistles (like a mov-
ing spotlight) added to it. Instead, it is that time is completely dif-
ferent from the dimensions of space. So different, in fact, that it is a 
completely different kind of dimension. For time (on The Dynamic 
Theory) is more similar to modality or morality than to space: we 
can call it a dimension, but it would be a mistake to think of it as one 
of several similar dimensions that together make up a unified mani-
fold that contains the physical universe.7
Here is the view.8 (Important note: the different components I 
am building into The Dynamic Theory need not all be combined 
in this way. There are various “mix and match” combinations that 
are possible (some of which have been explicitly endorsed). But this 
7 For a recent argument against the claim that time and space form a unified 
manifold of orthogonal dimensions, see Markosian 2020.
8 Some or all of the following components of The Dynamic Theory can be 
found in Prior 1967, Thomson 1983, Markosian 1993 and 2004, and Sullivan 
2012. (Not to mention many other places.)
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particular combination is among the most popular in the literature, 
and is arguably the most interesting. In any case it is the combination 
that I endorse, and the one that I will be discussing in this paper.)
The Dynamic Theory of Time
1. Time cannot be added to the dimensions of space to form a 
unified manifold in which physical objects are located and 
possibly extended.
2. Any physical object that persists through time does so in virtue 
of being wholly present at each moment at which it is present.9
3. There are genuine and irreducible A-properties, which cannot 
be correctly analyzed in terms of B-relations.
4. The temporal facts about the world include ever-changing 
facts involving A-properties, including facts about which times 
are past, which time is present, and which times are future.
5. We must take tense seriously. Propositions have truth values 
at times rather than simpliciter and can, in principle, change 
their truth values over time. Also, we cannot eliminate ver-
bal tenses like is, was, and will be from an ideal language.
6. The correct ontology is liable to change over time, and it is 
always true that only present objects exist.
I want to offer two better metaphors for capturing our two theories 
of time. For The Static Theory, the universe is like a movie that is 
never shown. The frames are all there, but the movie is just sitting 
on a shelf. Also, instead of being attached end to end, in the normal 
way of filmstrips, the frames are cut, and then stacked one on top 
of another (in chronological order). Each frame is a temporal slice 
of the world, and if you look closely at the stack of frames, you can 
see the various objects—each of which is a “spacetime worm”—
curving through the continuum that is spacetime. (It helps if you 
turn the stack sideways, so that earlier frames are to the left of later 
9 For a definition of ‘wholly present’ see Markosian 1994: 248.
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frames.) Importantly, on The Static Theory, because the movie is 
never shown, no part of it is metaphysically privileged. There is no 
light shining on any one frame. No frame is special.
For The Dynamic Theory, on the other hand, the universe is like 
a movie that is being shown in a theater right now. And, crucially, it’s 
not the frames in the filmstrip that are the universe: it is the image 
on the screen. There is only one image on the screen, and it keeps 
changing. That’s because reality is one thing that keeps changing. It 
was that way, and now it is this way. Soon it will be some other way.
The frames in the filmstrip up in the projection booth are a use-
ful way to represent the different states of the universe at different 
times, on The Dynamic Theory. They are like maximal, consistent, 
tensed propositions. There is always one of them that is special: the 
one that corresponds to the image on the screen right now. But it is 
important to understand that which frames are in the filmstrip, and 
which one has a light shining through it right now, is determined by 
the universe, and not the other way around. (So this is an important 
disanalogy between the universe and a movie being shown in a the-
ater, on The Dynamic Theory.)
This pair of movie theater metaphors to capture the two theories 
of time is essential to my preferred way of thinking about The Dy-
namic Theory and its rival, The Static Theory; and the metaphors 
will play an important role in the arguments below. But before I 
get to the problems with The Dynamic Theory and time travel to 
the past, let me first say something about time travel on The Static 
Theory of Time.
3 Time travel and the static theory of time
The Static Theory is normally thought of as being consistent with 
the possibility of traveling in time, and indeed Static Theorists love 
to theorize about time travel.10 The key, for Static Theorists, is that 
a time traveler is defined as someone whose personal time disagrees 
with external time.11 External time is the normal, objective, temporal 
10 See for example Lewis 1976, Vihvelin 1996, Sider 2002, Dyke 2005, Miller 
2017 and Bernstein 2015.
11 This definition of time travel and the following definitions of ‘personal 
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order experienced by non-time-travelers everywhere. Your personal 
time, on the other hand, is the series of times that results from or-
dering the events in your life according to standard causal patterns, 
so that eating precedes digestion, and so on. If you eat a sandwich 
before getting into your time machine in 2020, and then digest that 
sandwich after your arrival back in 1920, then your personal time 
is ordered accordingly. And, in that case, since your personal time 
would disagree with external time, you would be a time traveler.
But what makes it true that that person popping into existence in 
1920 with the sandwich in her stomach is you, according to the Static 
Theorist? The answer is that it’s a little bit complicated. Here is a short 
version of the account favored by David Lewis and many other Static 
Theorists. We start with facts about all of the qualities distributed 
over spacetime. Next we identify the most basic patterns displayed by 
the distribution of these qualities. These most basic patterns are the 
laws of nature. Then we use the laws to determine which events are 
causing which events, and which temporal parts are related to which 
other temporal parts by the different temporal parts of the same object 
relation. Once these facts are fixed, we get facts like the fact that that 
person stage in the time machine in 1920 is a part of the same person 
as this other person stage in the time machine in 2020. And finally, 
we order all of the person stages of one person according to the stan-
dard causal patterns—with eating preceding digestion—in order to 
get each person’s personal time. So on The Static Theory, as long as 
we have the right person stages with the right properties at the right 
times, so that we have some people whose personal times disagree 
with external time, there can be time travelers.
One possible response to this line of reasoning from the Static 
Theorist is, “That all sounds great, although there remains a troubling 
question: Why do we not see time travelers from the future? They 
would after all be easy to recognize, because they would all wear the 
same monochromatic outfits. And yet we do not see this. Strange!”12
time’ and ‘external time’ are from Lewis 1976: 146.
12 For the record, I do not endorse the argument suggested here. I think our 
failure to spot time travelers from the future is at best a small piece of defeasible 
evidence against the possibility of time travel to the past. But there are other pos-
sible explanations for our not seeing time travelers from the future. Perhaps they 
145The Dynamic Theory of Time
I think the explanation for this apparent mystery is that The Dy-
namic Theory of Time is true, and also that The Dynamic Theory is 
inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past. In the next 
four sections I will explain why.
4 The rubber duck argument
The first reason why The Dynamic Theory is inconsistent with the 
possibility of time travel to the past is that if The Dynamic Theory is 
true, then personal time is a rubber duck—it sounds like it is a type 
of time, but it’s really not. Here is why this is relevant. The Static 
Theorist is correct to say that someone’s adventures should count as 
traveling in time only if her personal time disagrees with external 
time. But an important corollary of this conception of time travel 
is that time travel is possible only if personal time is sufficiently like 
external time to deserve the name time. And if The Dynamic Theory 
is true, then personal time is not sufficiently like external time to 
deserve the name time. For personal time lacks pizzazz. The rea-
son personal time lacks pizzazz is that there is no equivalent of the 
(metaphorical) moving spotlight for personal time. That is, there is 
no special property of presentness that is instantiated by one special 
time, and then instantiated by another time, and so on. Without that 
feature, personal time, on The Dynamic Theory, is just an alterna-
tive way of lining up the events in someone’s life; but it does not give 
us something that is sufficiently like time to deserve the name time.
Here is an example to illustrate my point. Suppose you are playing 
a game. The game is made up of a series of discrete moves, each of 
which starts from the same position. There are 26 types of move—
A-type moves, B-type moves, etc.—with a billion instances of each 
type. Normally people playing the game first perform an A-type 
move, then a B-type move, etc. But that is not required by the rules. 
So you perform a series of moves in the game. It’s a series that, given 
the way people normally play this game, looks quite bizarre. You first 
perform a J-type move, followed by an S-type move, and then an 
A-type move, etc. Also, in addition to looking bizarre, your series 
don’t choose to visit our troubled era, with its widespread injustice. Or perhaps 
they do, but are careful to blend in.
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of moves in the game constitutes a poor effort, worthy of a very low 
score in the game. But suppose it just so happens that if your moves are 
re-ordered in the normal way, like a video being re-spliced, so that your 
A-type move comes first, and is followed by your B-type move, which 
is followed by your C-type move, etc., then your series of moves con-
stitutes the most brilliant and high-scoring game ever played.
Does the fact that when your moves are re-ordered in this way 
they disagree with their ordering in external time mean that you are 
a time traveler (who has in fact played the most brilliant game of this 
kind ever)? I don’t think so. I think it just means that the series of 
moves that you actually performed has a peculiar feature. It is a series 
that looks weird, but can be made to look normal by re-splicing. And 
the reason you are not a time traveler, despite the fact that your se-
ries of moves has this strange feature, is that there is nothing special 
about the particular way of re-ordering your moves that makes them 
look like a brilliant playing of the game. It is not a metaphysically 
privileged way of ordering the relevant events—it is just one of many 
possible ways that those events could be ordered.
We might say that that way of ordering your moves in the game 
corresponds to your “standard-game time” (by analogy with personal 
time), but it doesn’t follow that there is anything metaphysically sig-
nificant about that way of ordering the events. Nor does it follow that 
there is a special kind of time associated with that way of ordering 
your moves.
I think it’s the same with personal time. We can re-order the 
events of the time traveler’s life according to commonly seen patterns 
for those events, and it is remarkable that when we do so, we get an 
ordering that differs from the ordering of those events in external 
time. But it doesn’t follow that there is a special kind of time associat-
ed with the relevant ordering of the events of the time traveler’s life.
You might wonder what would make some particular way of order-
ing a series of events sufficiently like external time. Easy: there would 
have to be something equivalent to a moving spotlight that follows that 
particular way of ordering those events. That is, there would have to 
be a “moving flashlight” for the time traveler’s personal time. It would 
start at her birth, and move up to the moment when she pushes the 
button in the time machine. Then it would jump back to the much 
earlier arrival in the time machine. And this moving flashlight would 
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represent a metaphysically signiicant, temporal property, just like present-
ness, that moves across the events of the time traveler’s life, but in a 
way that is out of sync with the grand moving spotlight.
But of course there is no such moving flashlight, because there 
is no metaphysically signiicant, temporal property that moves across the 
events of the time traveler’s life in a way that is out of sync with the 
grand moving spotlight. The Dynamic Theory entails that there is a 
dynamic aspect to external time, but it does not entail that there is 
an additional dynamic aspect to each individual’s personal time. Nor 
is it in any way plausible to posit such a dynamic aspect to anyone’s 
personal time, as a metaphysical add-on to the Dynamic Theory. 
Which is why personal time is a rubber duck—it’s called “time” but 
it’s not really time.
Here is my argument.13
The Rubber Duck Argument
(1) If time travel is possible, then whether you are a time traveler 
depends on whether your personal time disagrees with exter-
nal time.
(2) If whether you are a time traveler depends on whether your 
personal time disagrees with external time, then personal 
time must be sufficiently like external time to deserve the 
name time.
(3) The Dynamic Theory entails that personal time is not suf-
ficiently like external time to deserve the name time.14
�
(4) The Dynamic Theory entails that time travel is not possible.
13 Theodore Sider offers a broadly similar argument, but one that differs in 
certain details, in Sider 2005.
14 John W. Carroll has suggested in correspondence that there may be a simi-
lar issue for The Static Theory of Time, which would mean that it too is incom-
patible with the possibility of time travel. I am sympathetic to this suggestion, but 
will not explore it here, since my aim in this paper is merely to argue that The 
Dynamic Theory, at least, entails the impossibility of time travel.
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(I note that this argument works equally well against the possibility 
of time travel to the future.)
There is a natural objection to this argument that will have oc-
curred to some readers. The objection begins by pointing out that it 
is the causal relations among the events of the time traveler’s life that 
generate the ordering of those events in the time traveler’s personal 
time. For example, the time traveler’s eating a sandwich right before 
pushing a button and then disappearing in 2020 causes the digesting 
events in the time traveler’s stomach in 1920; and this is precisely why 
the eating event precedes the digesting event in her personal time.
So far, so good. The next part of the natural objection involves 
the thought that ordering a series of events (like those of the time 
traveler’s life) according to the causal relations among those events is 
in no way arbitrary, and in fact gives us a very time-like ordering, in-
sofar as the notions of causation and time have long been thought to be 
inextricably linked.15 Thus, according to the objection, personal time 
is, after all, sufficiently like external time to deserve the name time.
My reply to this objection is that it works only if we assume The 
Static Theory of Time. For on The Dynamic Theory, there are im-
portant facts about time that are not captured merely by the fact that 
moments of time (and events in time) are ordered in a certain way. It 
is also essential to time—and hence to being sufficiently like time—
that there is a dynamic aspect to the temporal dimension. This is 
what is captured by the moving spotlight metaphor, and it is what is 
captured in a non-metaphorical way by the claim that there are genu-
ine and irreducible facts about A-properties, which keep changing in 
an inexorable way, no matter what anyone does. And this is why we 
would have to make the absurd posit of a moving flashlight for the 
time traveler’s personal time in order for personal time to be suf-
ficiently like external time. Without a moving flashlight—without a 
special property that attaches to the moments of personal time, in a 
way that keeps changing inexorably—personal time remains just an 
interesting, alternative way of ordering a bunch of events.
15 The so-called causal theory of time has a long history. See for example 
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic, Book II, Chapter 2, Section 
3B; Reichenbach 1956: 32–42, and Mellor 1998: Chapter 10.
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5 No backward causation
The second reason why The Dynamic Theory is inconsistent with 
the possibility of time travel to the past has to do with backward cau-
sation. To be a real time traveler, who travels, say, from 2020 back 
to 1920, your pushing the button in your time machine in 2020 must 
cause your appearance in 1920. Without that detail, it is not a story 
about time travel. But The Dynamic Theory entails that this kind 
of backward causation is impossible. That is, The Dynamic Theory 
entails the following thesis.
No Backward causatioN: Causes can never occur after their effects.
And here is why The Dynamic Theory entails No Backward causatioN. 
To cause some event is to make it happen. But The Dynamic Theory 
entails that there is a crucial distinction between an event’s going to 
happen, its happening, and its having happened. This is part of the Dy-
namic Theorist’s claim that we must take tense seriously (a.k.a. the 
fifth component of The Dynamic Theory), and it is a result of the real 
and objective distinctions made by the theory between past, present, 
and future (in the third and fourth components of the theory).
On The Static Theory, of course, there are no such distinctions. 
All the events are there, in a four-dimensional spread. Each event 
stands in various B-relations to other events. And that is all there is 
to time. Meanwhile, since, according to The Static Theory, the facts 
about causation are a function of the pattern of distribution of quali-
ties over spacetime, it turns out that there are no a priori rules about 
how causation can work. This is why The Static Theory is consistent 
with backward causation.
But on The Dynamic Theory, there is a great deal more to time. 
One way to see this is in terms of the movie metaphor. Think of the 
universe as a changing image on a movie screen. Let there be a scene 
in the movie that is the appearance (seemingly from nowhere) in 
1920 of a woman in a time machine. And let this scene be followed 
immediately by scenes of this woman’s having various adventures, 
until eventually she dies of old age in 1980. (It’s a really long movie.) 
Let there also be a scene in 1990 that is the birth of a baby girl, 
which scene is followed in the movie by her growing up, building a 
time machine, getting into the machine in 2020, setting the dials for 
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1920, and then disappearing. And, finally, let the woman who disap-
pears in 2020 be just like the woman who appears in 1920. (Similarly 
with the time machine in 2020 and the one in 1920.)
Now suppose we are watching the movie, and are right at the mo-
ment featuring the woman in the time machine in 2020. Suppose we 
see her, up on the screen, reaching for the button. And ask yourself 
whether this imminent event—her pushing the button—is going 
to cause that earlier event—the appearing from nowhere event in 
1920, the one involving a woman just like her. Given that the appear-
ing from nowhere event of 1920 already happened in the movie many 
years ago, it seems like the answer must be, No, this woman’s pushing 
the button now cannot possibly make that earlier event happen, because the 
earlier event was part of a scene that has already happened. It’s past.
Notice that even without the movie metaphor, it remains true 
(according to The Dynamic Theory) that there is a fundamental, 
unanalyzable difference between some event e’s going to happen, e’s 
happening, and e’s having happened. And this difference is the crucial 
difference between what is future, what is present, and what is past. 
On The Dynamic Theory, there are real, objective facts about these 
matters. There is a genuine and metaphysically significant difference 
between past, present, and future. And a crucial consequence of this 
distinction is that once an event has happened, it is too late to make it 
happen. The past is over.
So the American writer William Faulkner had it completely 
wrong when he wrote “The past is never dead. It isn’t even past.”16 
This is a beautiful way to capture The Static Theory of Time—but 
if The Static Theory is false, as I believe it is, then this is a beautiful 
way to capture a deeply mistaken idea about time.17 Meanwhile, the 
Irish folk singer Phil Coulter was on the right track when he wrote 
“For what’s done is done and what’s won is won, And what’s lost is 
lost and gone forever.”18 These are beautiful words, too, even though 
16 Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun, p. 73.
17 Also, to be fair to Faulkner, this idea is probably not what he actually had 
in mind when he wrote this line. I suspect that what he actually had in mind is 
something that is consistent with The Dynamic Theory, namely, the idea that 
traces of past events are always with us.
18 Coulter, The Town I Loved So Well, 1973.
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the idea they express is a metaphysically significant but deeply sad 
fact about reality.
Here is what I take to be the upshot of these remarks: Reality 
is tensed. There is only one image—the one on the screen—and 
it keeps changing. But once an event has happened, and is in the 
past—once a scene has appeared on the screen—it is thereafter too 
late to make it happen. That would be like trying to create a thing—
a building, say—that already exists. For once a building exists, it is 
too late to bring it into existence. The argument can be formulated 
as follows.
The No Backward causatioN Argument
(1) To cause an event is to make it happen.
(2) The Dynamic Theory entails that once an event has hap-
pened, it is too late to make it happen.
�
(3) The Dynamic Theory entails that backward causation is not 
possible.
(4) Time travel to the past is possible only if backward causation 
is possible.
�
(5) The Dynamic Theory entails that time travel to the past is 
not possible.
Here is a likely objection: This means that The Dynamic Theory is 
incompatible with certain theories of causation (like Counterfactual 
Dependence) and certain general pictures of how causation works 
(like the Lewisean “Humean Supervenience” picture), which allow 
for the possibility of backward causation.19
My reply is that I plead guilty. The Dynamic Theory does entail 
the substantive claim that there is more to causation than counterfac-
tual dependence. For counterfactual dependence can hold between 
19 On Counterfactual Dependence see Lewis 1973. On Humean Supervenience 
see Lewis 1994.
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an event and a later event, and The Dynamic Theory entails No Back-
ward causatioN. (Similarly with The Dynamic Theory and the general 
Humean Supervenience picture.)
Mind you, it’s not that there aren’t any possible worlds like the 
ones envisioned by the Static Theorist with a Lewisean account of 
time travel. It’s just that those are not genuine time travel worlds. 
For consider one of those worlds. Let it be an ideal scenario for the 
Static Theorist. A person in a strange machine pops into existence, 
seemingly from nowhere, in 1920, with lots of memory impressions 
that seem to be from 2020 of building a time machine, setting the 
dials for 1920, and pushing the button. That person lives out her days 
in the 20th Century, and then dies. Later, a girl is born, grows up, 
and in 2020 builds what looks like a time machine. She sets the dials 
for 1920. And as she pushes the button, she happens to be just like 
the woman who popped into existence back in 1920. Then she and 
her machine disappear.
This is a world with some amazing happenings and coincidences. 
It’s an amazing happening that this woman and her machine popped 
into existence when they did, out of nowhere, in 1920. It’s an amaz-
ing coincidence that the later woman with the alleged time machine 
in 2020 ended up being just like the miracle woman who popped up 
in 1920. And it’s an even more amazing coincidence that, right when 
the later woman with the alleged time machine came to be qualita-
tively identical to the woman who popped into existence in 1920, 
she (the later woman) suddenly popped out of existence!
But this is not a time travel world (on The Dynamic Theory), 
because the woman’s pushing the button in 2020 did not cause the 
appearance of the woman and the machine in 1920. This is guaran-
teed to be true (again assuming The Dynamic Theory) because of No 
Backward causatioN.
6 Only one next
My third reason for thinking that The Dynamic Theory of Time is 
inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past is that there 
is only one next. The idea behind this argument is similar to that 
behind The Rubber Duck Argument, but it is more of a big picture 
point. One way to make the point is in terms of the movie metaphor. 
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Imagine that we are watching the movie, and that it depicts what 
counts as an ideal time travel scenario, according to The Static Theo-
rist. First we saw an apparent time traveler popping into existence. 
Then we saw her living out her days in a constant state of amazement 
over how old-timey everything was. How fun that was for her! Then 
we watched her dying of old age, in 1980. After that we saw a girl 
being born in 1990. Then we watched the girl growing up and build-
ing a time machine. And now we see her getting into the machine 
and reaching for the button. What will happen next? Will she travel 
back in time? Will she next exist in 1920?
The answer is No. Many people existed in 1920, including the ap-
parent time traveler, who looked just like this woman on the screen 
now. (Remember when we saw that woman back there, right here 
on this screen? How exciting that was!) But what will happen next 
is that the movie will continue with the current scene, the way it 
always and inexorably does. What will happen next with respect to 
the would-be time traveler on the screen right now is that she and 
her misleadingly labeled “time machine” will disappear, never to be 
seen again. Unlucky! What will definitely not happen next is that the 
image on the screen will shift back to 1920 so the would-be time 
traveler can experience all of that. For (and here is the crucial point) 
the universe is a movie without lashbacks. It is a movie in which the story 
always progresses forward in time. So if the current image on the 
screen is of a woman in a machine about to push a button, and if the 
next image will show that the woman and the machine have disap-
peared, then what will happen next is that she will be gone. Even if 
there was an earlier scene in which someone like her in a machine 
like that popped into existence seemingly from nowhere, that does 
not make it true that what will happen next (in the image on the 
screen, which is the one and only reality) is that earlier scene. So 
what will happen next is that the other people on the screen will be 
standing around saying, “I wonder what happened to her!”
The upshot of these considerations is that it is not possible for 
her to go back to 1920. She, like the rest of us, can only go forward. 
Here is the argument.
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The “Only One Next” Argument
(1) If someone is about to travel back in time, then it must be 
true (in some important sense) that what she will experience 
next is an event in the past.
(2) The Dynamic Theory entails that it is never true (in any im-
portant sense) that what someone will experience next is an 
event in the past.
�
(3) The Dynamic Theory entails that time travel to the past is 
not possible.
It might be objected that there is an important sense in which what 
will happen next is that the woman who is about to push the button 
will experience popping into existence, seemingly from nowhere, 
back in 1920. For that is what will happen next in her personal time. 
This would be a good objection if The Static Theory were true. But 
we are now supposing that The Dynamic Theory is true, which 
means that there is only one reality (namely, the changing image on 
the screen). And it is because of this crucial fact that there is only 
one important sense of next, namely, what will happen next in the 
one and only reality.
7 Other times are not possible destinations
My fourth reason for thinking that The Dynamic Theory of Time is 
inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past, unlike the 
previous three reasons, depends crucially on the fact that I have built 
Presentism into my characterization of The Dynamic Theory (as 
the sixth tenet of the theory). Since some philosophers who endorse 
the other five tenets of The Dynamic Theory do not also endorse 
Presentism, this is worth flagging at the outset. (So please consider 
there to be a warning flag placed right here.)
We have seen that the reason The Static Theory is so amenable 
to the idea of time travel is that it spatializes time—it makes time 
one of four more or less similar dimensions in which the physical 
universe is spread out. This means that, setting aside problems about 
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whether the laws of nature permit this, it is theoretically possible 
for an object like you or me to move around in the four-dimensional 
manifold in a way that satisfies Lewis’s definition of time travel. For 
we are, on this view, just a bunch of people sitting around in a four-
dimensional manifold, and we can therefore think about getting up 
and moving to a different location in the manifold.
But of course on The Dynamic Theory, other times are not loca-
tions in a manifold. You might therefore wonder: What are other times, 
on The Dynamic Theory, if they are not locations in a manifold? This is an 
important question, and there are many different possible answers 
available to the Dynamic Theorist. A proper treatment of the issue 
would be beyond the scope of this paper, but in what follows I will 
summarize my favorite answer to this question. I take it to be a fairly 
representative account of other times, according to The Dynamic 
Theory, and I think that alternative Dynamic Theory accounts of 
other times would give rise to the same argument against time travel 
that I am going to give in this section, but I will not pursue that 
question here. So please consider the argument of this section to be 
more conditional than the previous arguments I have given: for it is 
conditional on including Presentism in The Dynamic Theory, and 
also on one particular way of accounting for other times, given the 
constraints of Presentism.
Recall that on The Dynamic Theory, time is more like modality 
than it is like space. And notice that modality is not a dimension in 
the manifold that houses our physical universe. Modality is a way of 
talking about how things might have been. Other possible worlds are 
best thought of as maximal, consistent ways things could be. They 
are enormous propositions.20
w is a possible world =df w is a maximal, consistent proposition.
Likewise, time is a way of talking about how things have been and 
will be. (‘I reached home at noon yesterday’ is a way of saying that 
x number of hours ago I reached home.) So times, on the view that 
I like, are best thought of as maximal, consistent, present-tensed 
20 This is one of several standard conceptions of possible worlds for those who 
do not accept David Lewis’s modal realism. See Plantinga 1974, Prior and Fine 
1977, Lewis 1986 and Menzel 2018 for some discussion of similar views.
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propositions. But they are the ones that have been true, are true, or will 
be true.
t is a time =df t is a maximal, consistent, present-tensed proposi-
tion that has been true, is true, or will be true.21
The present time is the one maximal, consistent, present-tensed 
proposition that is true right now. (Just as the actual world is the 
one maximal, consistent proposition that happens to be true.) The 
time 10 years from now is the maximal, consistent, present-tensed 
proposition that will be true 10 years from now. And similarly with 
other past and future times. They are like possible worlds—they are 
all logical constructs out of propositions.
Because times (like possible worlds) are logical constructs out of 
propositions, they are not possible travel destinations. You cannot 
travel to another possible world, because it is a logical construct, 
rather than a concrete place. And you cannot travel to another time 
for the same reason. Here then is the argument.
The No-Destination Argument
(1) The Dynamic Theory entails that other times are logical con-
structs rather than locations in a manifold.
(2) If other times are logical constructs rather than locations in 
a manifold, then other times are not possible travel destina-
tions.
(3) If other times are not possible travel destinations, then time 
travel is not possible.
�
(4) The Dynamic Theory entails that time travel is not possible.
It should be pointed out that this argument (like The Rubber Duck 
Argument) works equally well against the possibility of time travel 
to the future. It is also worth noticing that there is a modal analogue 
of The No-Destination Argument, with the conclusion that Modal 
21 See for example Prior and Fine 1977, Markosian 2004: Section 3.10, and 
Emery 2017.
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Actualism entails that modal travel is impossible. I would endorse 
that argument, too, as would nearly every philosopher who is not a 
modal realist. (While most modal realists, like David Lewis, would 
argue that modal travel is impossible for other reasons. Modal travel 
is not nearly as popular a concept as time travel.)
It is worth re-emphasizing that this argument depends crucially 
on the sixth component that I have built into The Dynamic Theory 
of time, namely, Presentism. So the argument will not apply to those 
who endorse a view consisting of only the first five tenets of the view 
that I am calling The Dynamic Theory. Notice also that the argu-
ment is distinct from an argument that one sometimes encounters, 
according to which Presentism is inconsistent with the possibility 
of time travel because it entails that the past and the future do not 
exist.22 For according to what I have just said, past and future times 
do exist—the problem, instead, is that they are not suitable travel 
destinations.
8 A surprising corollary
There is a surprising corollary of the above arguments. If I am right 
about any of these arguments, then The Dynamic Theory of Time 
entails that time travel to the past is metaphysically impossible. So 
if we encounter people who seem to be time travelers from the fu-
ture—people who show up with a strange but credible story about 
how they come from the future (not to mention the monochromatic 
outfits)—then we would have excellent empirical evidence against 
The Dynamic Theory. This means that The Dynamic Theory of 
Time, unlike many metaphysical theories, is empirically falsiiable.23
22 Keller and Nelson criticize such arguments in their 2001.
23 There is a slight complication here. I happen to be convinced, by anti-skep-
tical arguments like those found in Markosian 2014, that I do in fact know that 
I am not a brain in a vat. But if I encountered apparent time travelers with a 
plausible story, as described above, then I would probably not conclude that The 
Dynamic Theory is false. Instead, I would probably conclude that I am a brain in 
a vat after all (and I would tip my hat to my alien overlords for making the illusion 
they are feeding me so interesting).
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9 Don’t push that button!
Suppose I am wrong about all of the above. Suppose personal time 
(even on The Dynamic Theory) is sufficiently like external time to 
make it deserve the name time. Suppose backward causation is pos-
sible (even on The Dynamic Theory). Suppose the fact that there is 
only one next is somehow not enough (even on The Dynamic Theory) 
to make it true that you can’t travel back in time. And suppose that 
(even on The Dynamic Theory) other times somehow are possible 
travel destinations. I think there is still a good reason why you should 
not want to travel back in time, given The Dynamic Theory of Time.
In order to see why, return to our story of a woman who travels 
back in time from 2020 to 1920. And consider two different contexts 
in which you could be advising someone about what to choose. The 
first context is an extra-world context, like the situation Atlanta finds 
herself in in Plato’s Myth of Er, in Book X of The Republic. Atlanta, in 
that situation, was choosing an entire life, all at once. (In the story, 
Atlanta was able to view a bunch of different lives that were available 
to her. The different lives were displayed on the ground in front of 
her like little holograms. She ended up choosing the life of a great 
athlete who—unlike herself in her previous life—was allowed to 
participate in athletic competitions and win prizes and glory.) The 
second context in which you could be advising someone is an in-
tra-world context. In this kind of situation, you are offering advice to 
someone about choosing how to continue the life that they are al-
ready living. (This is how we normally advise our friends.)
Now think about how we would advise our heroine from the time 
travel scenario in an extra-world context. “Go for the time travel 
world,” we would say to her. “That would be so much fun! You will 
experience the same amount of life, altogether, but with your ex-
periences in a weird order. Your personal time will disagree with 
external time, but you will still have a full lifetime’s worth of expe-
riences, and many of them will involve experiencing life as a time 
traveler. It will be awesome!” (Keep in mind that we are here set-
ting aside the previous four arguments against the possibility of time 
travel to the past.)
And now think about how we would advise our heroine in an 
intra-world context. Suppose that she has climbed into a machine 
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that she built, with a dial set for 1920, and she is contemplating push-
ing the big red button. “What do you think I should do?” she asks 
us. Our reply should be, “Stay alive, no matter what occurs!” For it 
doesn’t matter (much) what happened 100 years ago. What matters 
is what will happen next. (This point is closely related to The “Only 
One Next” Argument.)
The reason for this difference in how we would advise our hero-
ine in extra-world versus intra-world contexts is that when we are in 
the middle of living our lives, we have a bias toward the future. We 
also have biases toward the present, and toward the near future over 
the distant future. These well-known time-biases are sensible, given 
The Dynamic Theory of Time. (But maybe not so sensible on The 
Static Theory.)24
And here is why all of this is relevant. When you are making 
decisions, you are always in an intra-world context. You are always 
deciding how to continue the life that you are already living. So as 
you sit in the time machine (which we are no longer supposing to be 
a misleadingly labeled annihilator), you are making an intra-world 
decision, about what will happen to you next. And the best decision 
for you, like the best decision for our heroine in an intra-world con-
text, is not to go out of existence forever. (No matter what has hap-
pened in the past.) For here is what is true, on our suppositions, and 
in the relevant situation: If you push the button, then that person in 
the past (whose experiences do not now benefit you in any practical 
way, since you have no memory of them) will have been you, and you 
will be a time traveler, but you will now go out of existence forever. 
And if you don’t push the button, then that person in the past will 
not have been you (but will have been an amazing coincidence), you 
will not be a time traveler, and you will continue to exist for a good 
long time. My advice to you, in this situation, is what I suspect any 
kind person would advise in such an intra-world context: Don’t push 
that button!
Here is the argument suggested by these considerations.
24 On various problems relating to our time biases see Sullivan 2018.
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An Argument Against the Advisability of Traveling Back in Time
(1) The Dynamic Theory of Time entails that leaving the pres-
ent to go back to the past involves permanently going out of 
existence.
(2) Permanently going out of existence in order to ensure the 
truth of some propositions about yourself in the past is not an 
advisable tradeoff.
(3) If (1) and (2), then The Dynamic Theory entails that travel-
ing back in time is not advisable.
�
(4) The Dynamic Theory entails that traveling back in time is 
not advisable.
This argument comes with three main caveats. The first is that, like 
The No-Destination Argument (and unlike the first three arguments 
I have given), it depends on including Presentism as a part of The 
Dynamic Theory. The second caveat is that this argument does not 
apply to all cases of time travel to the past. For if you have excellent 
evidence that you will not be making a one-way trip to the past, but 
will, for example, spend a month in 1920 and then return to the 
present time (or even some time in the near future), then pushing the 
button in the time machine will not (according to your evidence) lead 
to your permanently going out of existence. (There may of course 
be questions about whether the true account of personal identity for 
human people like ourselves allows for periods of temporary non-ex-
istence, but let us set that issue aside.) So the above argument applies 
only to cases of one-way time travel to the past. The third caveat is 
that in some cases it is advisable to permanently go out of existence. 
For if conditions in the world and in one’s life have become so bad 
that one’s life is worse than non-existence, then all bets are off. But 
if we assume that you are living a life that is worth living, and if we 
assume we are talking about one-way time travel to the past, then 
time travel to the past is clearly inadvisable on The Dynamic Theory.
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10 What are we thinking about when we think about time 
travel to the past?
If what I have said above is correct, and if The Dynamic Theory of 
Time is true, then there is something very puzzling going on when 
we think about time travel to the past. For if The Dynamic Theory 
is inconsistent with the possibility of this kind of time travel, and if 
The Dynamic Theory is true, then such time travel is not metaphysi-
cally possible. This raises a question: What are we imagining when 
we imagine time travel to the past? It certainly doesn’t feel like we 
are imagining something impossible.
Here is the first part of my answer to this question. I think that 
for many depictions of time travel in, for example, books and movies, 
we are simply being told a story with flashbacks. What’s more, in the 
story, the empirical details are just as the Static Theorist would like 
them to be, in order to be a case of time travel. And the characters 
in the story often accept that theirs is a genuine case of time travel. 
But of course there is no way for the fiction really to depict things 
as being a genuine case of time travel, whether time travel is possible 
or not. A fiction cannot somehow depict that the metaphysical facts 
are a certain way. So on my view, these are stories, told with flash-
backs, of people who mistakenly think they are time travelers (or 
mistakenly think they are dealing with time travelers), when they’re 
really not.25
That’s fine, you might think, but what about the fact that we 
can imagine ourselves traveling back in time? When you imagine a 
time travel story in the first person, you are imagining a series of 
events, seen from a first-person perspective: “First I am building 
the time machine. Then I am setting the dials. Then I am pushing 
the button in 2020 and, next, finding myself in the year 1920.” 
And yet, if I am right, and if The Dynamic Theory is true, then 
what seems like a perfectly possible series of experiences, imagin-
able by a six-year old, is in fact not possible after all. And yet it feels 
possible. What’s up with that?
25 Bourne and Caddick Bourne offer a similar account of what is happening 
when third-person fictions appear to portray certain kinds of time travel stories 
that they take to be impossible (for reasons of their own). See their 2016: 129ff.
Ned Markosian162
The answer (and this is the second part of my response to the 
general challenge about why we can effortlessly entertain time travel 
stories, if what they depict is metaphysically impossible) is that when 
you imagine such a series of experiences, you are not really imagin-
ing yourself being time a traveler. Instead, you are imagining push-
ing a button and then continuing to exist while everything around 
you pops out of existence, and a whole bunch of things just like the 
things that existed in 1920 pop into existence. And while all of this is 
happening, reality keeps humming along, right through the shocking 
disappearance of everything but you in 2020 and the simultaneous 
appearance of a whole lot of 1920-looking things. This is of course a 
pretty bizarre scenario, and probably not one that you actually want 
to wish for, since it involves all of your friends and loved ones pop-
ping out of existence. But at least it is metaphysically possible, which 
is why you can imagine it.
11 Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed two popular theories of time, each one 
consisting of a package of specific theses that are related, but not 
essentially tied together. These two theories are not the only theo-
ries of time, or even the only popular theories of time. (Although I 
suspect that they happen to be the two most popular theories among 
contemporary metaphysicians.) One of the two theories discussed 
here—what I have called The Static Theory of Time—was consid-
ered mainly in order to contrast it with the theory that my argu-
ments focused on, the view that I called The Dynamic Theory of 
Time. So the fact that there are alternatives to The Static Theory, as 
I have presented it here (that is, other packages that contain some but 
not all of the specific components of the package I have identified), 
does not have any bearing on the arguments of this paper.
But it is of course relevant that there are alternatives to The Dy-
namic Theory of Time, as I have presented it here, since my argu-
ments have focused on that particular package of views. Still, the 
only component of The Dynamic Theory, as it is presented here, that 
anyone with Dynamic Theory sympathies is likely reject is the sixth 
one, namely, Presentism. So it is worth pointing out that only two 
of the five arguments offered in this paper—The No-Destination 
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Argument and An Argument Against the Advisability of Traveling 
Back in Time—depend on including Presentism in the package of 
views that I have called The Dynamic Theory of Time. Which means 
that the other three arguments presented in this paper—The Rub-
ber Duck Argument, The No Backward causatioN Argument, and The 
“Only One Next” Argument—will all apply to the other popular ver-
sions of The Dynamic Theory of Time. So if you believe that time is 
significantly different from space, that physical objects do not have 
temporal parts, that there are genuine and irreducible A-properties 
(which cannot be correctly analyzed in terms of B-relations), that the 
temporal facts about the world include ever-changing facts involving 
A-properties, and that we must take tense seriously, then you should 
believe that it is impossible to travel back in time. Moreover, if you 
believe all of the components of what I have called The Dynamic 
Theory of Time (including Presentism), but still think for some rea-
son (despite all of my arguments) that it is possible to travel back in 
time, then you should nevertheless not want to travel back in time. So 
I end with the same advice that I gave above: Don’t push that button!26
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